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We put forward a hybrid quantum key distribution protocol based on coherent states, Gaussian modulation,
and photon-number-resolving (PNR) detectors, and show that it may enhance the secret key generation rate
(KGR) compared to homodyne-based schemes. Improvement in the KGR may be traced back to the dependence
of the two-dimensional discrete output variable on both the input quadratures, thus overcoming the limitations
of the original protocol. When reverse reconciliation is considered, the scheme based on PNR detectors out-
performs the homodyne one both for individual and collective attacks. In the presence of direct reconciliation,
the PNR strategy is still the best one against individual attacks, but for the collective ones the homodyne-based
scheme is still to be preferred as the channel transmissivity decreases.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, continuous-variable quantum key distri-
bution (QKD) based on coherent states and homodyne detec-
tion (HD-QKD) gained much attention in the cryptographic
community [1]. In particular, the compatibility with telecom
techniques and the high-detection efficiency makes HD-QKD
of interest for practical implementations [2]. Moreover, the
recent advances in establishing continuous-variable ground-
satellite quantum channels [3, 4] exploiting coherent states
and homodyne detection has opened the way to the possibility
of a global QKD network. Heterodyne based protocols has
been also suggested [5] and the secret key rate valid against
individual attacks has been analyzed [6, 7].
Usually, in HD-QKD an observable with a continuous spec-
trum is used to encode the information which will be used to
extract the secret key. For example, in the original continuous-
variable (CV) protocol based on coherent states [8, 9], the in-
formation is encoded by Gaussian modulation of phase and
amplitude of an input coherent state, whereas the secret key
is retrieved by a slicing protocol processing the data from a
homodyne detector.
Here we consider a CV-QKD protocol based on coherent
states, but we substitute the homodyne detector with a scheme
based on photon-number-resolving (PNR) detectors. While
in a typical homodyne detection one measures the difference
photocurrent from a couple of pin photodiodes [10] able to
detect a macroscopic photocurrent proportional to the number
of photons, here we consider a scenario in which the num-
ber of photons is measured at the two detectors. Recent theo-
retical [11, 12] and experimental results [13, 14] have shown
that detection schemes aimed to measure the photon number
statistics can be exploited in order to obtain some useful in-
formation about the field quadratures. Motivated by these
results, we investigate whether, and to which extent, these
PNR-detection schemes can be employed in QKD protocols.
Throughout the paper we will refer to this kind of protocol as
∗Electronic address: stefano.olivares@fisica.unimi.it
PNR-QKD. More in details, we will address the mutual infor-
mation between sender, receiver and eavesdropper, as a figure
of merit to assess the performance of the PNR-based protocols
[15].
The paper is structured as follows. In section II we review
the principles of the HD-QKD based on coherent states and
evaluate the mutual information between sender and receiver
and between sender and eavesdropper, in order to assess the
maximum key generation rate (KGR) [15]. Then, section III
illustrates our novel PNR-QKD: we show that the presence of
two PNR detectors allows to extract more information about
the detected signals. In our analysis we consider the couple
of numbers corresponding to the detected photons as a two-
dimensional statistical variable. We find that there exists a
threshold value on the LO energy above which PNR-QKD
outperforms HD-QKD. In this regime, we investigate the per-
formance of the PNR-QKD with respect to HD-QKD in the
presence of individual and collective attacks and for direct and
reverse reconciliation. Section IV closes the paper with some
concluding remarks.
II. HD-QKDWITH COHERENT STATES
In HD-QKD (top panel of Fig. 1), Alice, the sender, draws
two random real numbers, x and y, from a normal distribu-
tionNµ,σ2(z), with mean value µ = 0 and variance σ2 = Σ2.
Then, Alice prepares the coherent state |α〉 = |x+ iy〉, which
is sent to Bob through a quantum channel. Then, the receiver,
Bob performs homodyne detection by mixing the signal at a
balanced beam splitter (BS) with a local oscillator (LO), i.e.
a highly excited coherent state. Upon setting the LO phase at
either φ = 0 or φ = pi/2, Bob can detect the quadratures xˆ or yˆ,
respectively. In order to distribute a secret key, Bob chooses
randomly to measure either one quadrature or the other on
the signal received from Alice. After repeating this proce-
dure several times, the partners share a string of (real) random
variables, whose correlations are quantified by the mutual in-
formation I(A;B), where A and B are the random variables of
Alice and Bob, respectively, with joint distribution PAB(a,b)
and marginal distributions PA(a) and PB(b).
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FIG. 1: (Top) Scheme of homodyne detection-based QKD (HD-
QKD). (Bottom) Scheme of PNR-based QKD, in which the two PNR
detectors are used together with a low-intensity LO. The parameter
η refers to the overall channel transmissivity.
See the text for details.
In the ideal case of lossless channel, we have [8]:
I(A;B) = H(A;B)−H(A|B)−H(B|A), (1)
=
1
2
log2(1+4Σ
2), (2)
where H(A;B) is the joint (Shannon) entropy, H(A|B) and
H(B|A) are the conditional entropies of A and B.
Losses, including the quantum efficiency of the detectors,
can be described by an overall channel transmissivity η , 0 ≤
η ≤ 1 (see Fig. 1). In this case, the mutual information be-
tween the parties is unavoidably reduced and becomes:
I(A;B) =
1
2
log2(1+4ηΣ
2). (3)
Starting from their shared correlated variables, Alice and Bob
may distill a secret shared key using reconciliation [16] and
privacy amplification [17], both making use of a classical
channel. The presence of losses allows an eavesdropper, Eve,
to obtain some information about Alice’s random variable
without being detected, upon hiding herself within the chan-
nel loss. In this case, the amount of information is limited
by the no-cloning theorem [18, 19]. More in details, the rec-
onciliation stage requires a flow of information from Alice to
Bob (direct reconciliation, DR) or viceversa (reverse recon-
ciliation, RR) in order to correct the transmission errors and
agree on a common bit string, which is thus partially known
by the eavesdropper. In the first case (DR), Alice’s data form
the secret key, therefore it is important to evaluate the infor-
mation shared between Alice and Eve. In RR, the secret key
is instead based on Bob’s data and the information shared be-
tween Bob and Eve becomes the relevant player. The evalua-
tion of the information shared between the parties requires to
understand also what is the kind of measurement performed.
Here we focus on individual attacks (each pulse signal is mea-
sured individually) and collective attacks (the measurement
involves all the sent pulses) [20]. In the following we assume
that also Eve uses homodyne detection. This is a standard,
feasible technique which mimics the detection system used by
Bob but with a strong LO and pin photodiods without-photon-
number resolving capabilities (for a more general discussion
on the optimality of Gaussian attacks see Refs. [21] and [22]).
In the presence of individual attacks, the information shared
by Eve and Alice is quantified by the corresponding mutual in-
formation I(A;E) = 12 log2
[
1+4(1−η)Σ2]. Assuming DR,
the secret KGR is given by [15]:
∆I(ind)D = I(A;B)− I(A;E) , (4)
that is valid for any QKD scheme where classical communica-
tion is permitted. In particular, upon running the homodyne-
based protocol proposed in Ref. [8], we have:
∆I(ind)D =
1
2
log2
[
1+4ηΣ2
1+4(1−η)Σ2
]
(5)
which is positive if η > 0.5, that is, the overall losses should
be less than 3 dB. This limit can be beaten using RR, obtaining
the following KGR :
∆I(ind)R = I(A;B)− I(E;B), (6)
=
1
2
log2
[
1+4Σ2
1+4(1−η)Σ2
]
. (7)
When Eve can perform collective measurements (but Bob
doesn’t), we should substitute to I(A;E) and I(B;E) the
Holevo information [23] in the previous formulas. The ana-
lytical results are quite cumbersome, but they can be obtained
straightforwardly given the state of Eve conditioned to Bob’s
measurement outcome [24] as we will describe in the next
section (see also Ref. [25] for further details).
III. PNR-QKDWITH COHERENT STATES
In this section we focus on the use of detectors able to
discriminate the number of photons, in order to investigate
whether the KGR can be improved [1]. As we will see in the
following, this provides additional information at the output,
which may be used to improve the secret KGR. In our scheme,
the two photodiodes usually employed to build homodyne de-
tection in HD-QKD are replaced by two PNR detectors. Fur-
thermore, the high-intensity LO needed to implement homo-
dyne detection is replaced with a relatively low-intensity (up
to tens of photons) one, |βeiφ 〉 with β ∈ R (see the bottom
panel of Fig. 1).
In order to evaluate the statistics at the output, we recall
that the output state of a balanced BS fed by coherent states is
factorized UBS|α〉|βeiφ 〉= |(α+βeiφ )/
√
2〉|(βeiφ−α)/√2〉,
α = x+ iy. The photon statistics measured by the two PNR
detectors at the BS outputs are thus given by two Poisson dis-
tributions
Pk(n;µk) = e−µkµnk /n!, (k = 1,2), (8)
where the average numbers of photocounts µk ≡
µk(x,y,β ,φ ,η) are given by (we take into account the
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FIG. 2: The mutual information IAB = I(X;L) for a lossless channel
as a function of β and for different values of Σ2: from bottom to top
Σ2 = 1, 2 and 3. The red solid line refers to PNR-QKD and the blue
dashed one to HD-QKD (the latter is independent of β ). Notice the
presence of a threshold of LO amplitude β above which PNR-QKD
outperforms HD-QKD.
presence of the losses):
µ1 =
η(x2+ y2)+β 2
2
+
√
ηβ (xcosφ + ysinφ), (9a)
µ2 =
η(x2+ y2)+β 2
2
−√ηβ (xcosφ + ysinφ ). (9b)
It is worth noting that, since Eqs. (9) depend on both x and
p, the PNR-QKD scheme may exploit the whole Alice’s input
random variables X = (X ,Y ), while, using homodyne detec-
tion, the information about one of them is traced out at each
run, due to Bob’s measurement choice [8].
To investigate the performance of PNR-QKD with re-
spect to the homodyne-based scheme, we consider the two-
dimensional statistical variable corresponding to the two num-
bers of detected photons, namely, the two-dimensional dis-
crete random variable L = (N,M), N,M > 0. The two vari-
ables N and M are distributed according to the Poisson dis-
tributions mentioned above. The joint distribution of the de-
tected photons n and m is thus given by
PXL(x,y;n,m) =N0,Σ2(x)N0,Σ2(y)P1(n,µ1)P2(m,µ2).
(10)
Starting from the joint distribution, we can calculate the two
marginals and evaluate the mutual information
I(X;L) = H(X,L)−H(X|L)−H(L|X) . (11)
Without loss of generality we set φ = 0. The mutual infor-
mation for an ideal channel, with neither eavesdroppers nor
losses, i.e. η = 1, is reported in Fig. 2 as a function of β . We
see that there is a threshold on the value of β , above which
the mutual information I(X;L) for the PNR-QKD protocol is
larger than the corresponding quantity for the HD-QKD.
Figure 3 shows the threshold βth as a function of Σ2. The
monotone decreasing behaviour of βth can be understand as
follows. If Σ2 increases, we are “feeding” both the random
variables X and Y in the PNR-QKD scheme, while only one
of them in HD-QKD, i.e. we are accentuating the convenience
of PNR-QKD with respect to HD-QKD.
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FIG. 3: Plot of the threshold value βth as a function of Σ2: for β ≥ βth
PNR-QKD outperforms HD-QKD.
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FIG. 4: The KGR ∆I(ind) as a function of the channel transmissivity
η in the presence of individual attacks for HD-QKD (green) or PNR-
QKD (red), referring to the scenarios in which both Bob and Eve
employ homodyne detection and the one in which they both use PNR
detectors, respectively. We set β = 2 and Σ2 = 2. In this case PNR-
QKD outperforms HD-QKD in both cases of DR and RR.
A. Individual attacks
Let us now discuss the key generation rate in the presence
of losses and of an eavesdropper, Eve, in the framework of
individual attacks. In this case Eve performs a measurement
in the same way on each state sent by Alice before the recon-
ciliation stage and the key generation rate is given by Eq. (4)
[20]. As we have seen above, the PNR-QKD protocol based
on PNR is providing a larger information about the input al-
phabet compared to the homodyne case. Therefore, since we
have to consider the best strategy for the eavesdropper, we as-
sume that Eve employs the PNR scheme, if available. This
leads us to compare two scenarios, the one in which both Bob
and Eve employ homodyne detection and the one in which
they both use PNR detectors. The mixed case, where Bob
uses homodyne detection and Eve PNR one, has no practical
meaning, since during the reconciliation protocol Alice and
Bob will deal only with one random variable (say X) and thus
Eve’s information about the other random variable Y is com-
pletely irrelevant. This also means that Eve cannot use PNR
detection in order to break the original homodyne protocol [8].
In Fig. 4 we show the key generation rate ∆I(ind) as a func-
tion of the channel transmission η for HD-QKD and PNR-
QKD in the case of DR (solid lines) and RR (dashed lines):
PNR-QKD turns out to be the best strategy in the presence of
individual attacks. The enhancement may be traced back to
the dependence of the output variable L on both the full Al-
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FIG. 5: The KGR ∆I(coll) as a function of the channel transmissivity
η in the presence of collective attacks for HD-QKD (green) or PNR-
QKD (red). We set β = 2 and Σ2 = 2. Now PNR-QKD beats HD-
QKD for any value of η only in the case of RR, whereas, if we use
DR, PNR-QKD turns out to be the best strategy only for high values
of the channel transmissivity.
ice’s alphabet X and not only on one of the components (either
x or y), as it unavoidably happens for the original homodyne
protocol. Since Bob’s measurement is symmetric with respect
to Eve’s one, the threshold η = 0.5 does not depend on Σ2.
B. Collective attacks
To perform collective attacks Eve should store each quan-
tum state sent by Alice and measure it only after the classi-
cal key distillation procedure. Now Eve can implement an
optimal measurement, therefore the new figure of merit for
the KGR and DR is given by (as mentioned above, for a fair
comparison with the PNR-QKD we assume that Bob does not
perform a collective measurement) [20]:
∆I(coll)D = I(X;L)−χ(A;E), (12)
where χ(A;E) = S[ρE ]−∑x p(x)S[ρE|x] is the Holevo infor-
mation between Alice and Eve, with S[ρ] =−Tr[ρ log2ρ] be-
ing the von Neumann entropy of the state ρ , we are assuming
that Eve receives the state ρE|x with probability p(x) and, thus,
ρE = ∑x p(x)ρE|x. To calculate χ(A;E) we must distinguish
HD-QKD from PNR-QKD, since in the first case the useful
information is contained only in one single quadrature (say
X) while in PNR-QKD in both X and Y (the difference ap-
pears essentially in the reconciliation stage). According to the
protocol, in the case of HD-QKD Eve receives the mixed state
(the information about the random variable y is lost):
ρE|x =
∫
R
N0,Σ2(y) |
√
1−η(x+ iy)〉〈
√
1−η(x+ iy)|dy
(13)
with probability N0,Σ2(x) [25]. By contrast, in PNR-QKD
Alice is sending information stored in both X and Y , therefore
Eve’s conditional state is now the pure state
ρE|(x,y) = |
√
1−η(x+ iy)〉〈
√
1−η(x+ iy)| (14)
and S[ρE|(x,y)] = 0, while ρE is the same as in HD-QKD.
When RR is considered, we should substitute χ(E;B) =
S[ρE ]−∑n,m p(n,m)S
[
ρE|(n,m)
]
to χ(A;E) into Eq. (12). Here
p(n,m) is the marginal of PXL(x,y;n,m) given in Eq. (10), i.e.
the joint distribution fo obtaining n and m number of photons
at Bob’s PNR detectors, and ρE|(n,m) is the corresponding con-
ditional state received by Eve.
The KGR for collective attacks is depicted in Fig. 5 as a
function of η in the case of HD-QKD and PNR-QKD for
DR and RR. It is clear that, in the framework of collective at-
tacks and DR (solid lines), HD-QKD outperforms PNR-QKD
(but for very high channel transmissivity!). Nevertheless, in
the presence of RR we still find that PNR-QKD beats the
scheme based on homodyne detection, though, as the channel
transmissivity decreases, they exhibit almost the same perfor-
mance.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In conclusion, we have shown that PNR detectors may be
profitably employed to design a hybrid quantum key distri-
bution protocol using coherent states. If we restrict to in-
dividual attacks, when we exploit the full information at the
output to implement PNR-QKD, the dependence of the two-
dimensional discrete output variable on both the input quadra-
tures provides enhancement of the secret KGR compared to
HD-QKD, both for DR and RR. In the presence of collective
attacks and RR the PNR-QKD still outperforms the homodyne
based strategy, though, as the transmission of the channel de-
creases, the performance is almost the same as that of the HD-
QKD. If we consider DR, the strategy based on PNR turns out
to be the best choice only for very high values of the channel
transmissivity. This is due to the conditional state received by
Eve: in the case of HD-QKD it is a mixed state (the infor-
mation about one quadrature is lost), whereas for PNR-QKD
she receives pure states, having access to both the orthogonal
quadratures, and, thus leading to a clear increase of the overall
gained information.
If we focus on the regimes where using PNR leads to
greater ∆I, we can also note that PNR-QKD requires a lower
value of η with respect to HD-QKD in order to obtain a given
value of the KGR. This can be indeed an advantage, also con-
sidering that the state-of-the-art technology exploiting PNR
detectors cannot achieve the overall quantum efficiency of ho-
modyne detectors. In practice, homodyne setups may eas-
ily exhibit quantum efficiencies larger than 0.8, whereas cus-
tomary PNR detectors are about 0.5 [14] or less. Neverthe-
less, there exist photon-number-resolving techniques based on
transition-edge sensors which allows to obtain a much higher
efficiency, ≈ 0.9 or higher [26, 27].
Further investigation is expected upon the design of scheme
for distilling a secret key after having run the protocol and the
investigation of performances for PNR detector based proto-
cols involving not just simple homodyne detection at the re-
ceiver, but also heterodyne detection [5–7, 21, 22]. In this
view, our results pave the way for further developments in this
promising field of quantum technology.
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